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Privatization of state-owned enterprises has played a crucial role of structural 
reform in many developed and developing countries. In many cases, state-owned 
enterprises provide public utility and infrastructure which is characterized as a large, 
non-rival and indivisible public capital good. For privatization of this type of state-
owned enterprises --- transfer to the private sector with substantial market power, 
the impact on economic growth and economic welfare is vague. From the real 
world evidence that privatization of natural monopolies can sometimes worsen the 
economic welfare, the immediate question arises is: Should this indivisible public 
capital be provided by the government or by privatized monopoly? This paper 
develops a unifying theoretical framework to study 3 different regimes, namely (1) 
social planner model (benchmark case), (2) provision of public capital by the 
government and (3) provision of public capital by publicly owned monopoly. In 
model simulation, we show that if government provides the public capital, the 
resulting growth rate and welfare is higher than under provision by monopoly. 
However, when regulation like profit cap is imposed on the monopoly, the resulting 

















I would like to express my thankfulness to my supervisor Prof. Leung, Ka Yui for 
his patient supervision and devotion of his precious time. He has been providing 
detailed, thoughtful, and constructive comments on almost every aspect of this 
thesis. Without his continuous guidance and encouragement, this thesis would not 
have been up to this standard. I would thank my internal examiners, Prof. Meng， 
Qinglai and Prof. Wang, You Qiang for their advices on the earlier version of this 
thesis. 
Thanks also go to Prof. Wang, Yong, one of the most intelligent professors 
in our department, who provided me with great technical advice at the early stage 
of setting up the model. Shing Chak Hung, my fellow classmate in HKU with 
great talent in economics, had a long discussion with me and helped me overcome 
most intuitive problems in the thesis. 
I always treasure the genuine friendship built with my fellow classmates 
during these 2 years; in particular, I am very grateful to Kong Tze Shan, Ho Wai 
Yee, Cheung Hiu Yan, Chung Kwong Leung, Lam Suet Man, Chan Chi Wai, Tarn 
Wai Man, Lau Yuen Ke, So Pik Ki, Lao Man Hoi, Fan Chun Kong, Liu Guo Xin, 
Leong Chan Fai, Lee Man Fai, Leung Ping Fai, Shek Ming Hon, Cheng Wing Yan. 
Chan Yin Sze, Lee Suk Yin，Lam Siu Kuen. My life in this master programme 
iv 
was no longer be dull and boring as we spent some great time together in learning, 
playing and sharing. 
My friends in CCC Leung Faat Memorial Church also gave me many 
warmths and supports; especially I would like to thank Chan Shuk Mei for her 
technical assistance while drafting the Chinese version of the thesis abstract. 
Finally, my sincere gratitude goes to my family members for their moral 
support in the past years of studies. 
V 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
Abstract i 
Acknowledgement iii 
Table of Content v 
List of Table vi 
List of Appendices vii 
Chapter 1. Introduction 1 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 5 
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework 8 
3.1 Regime 1 ( Social Planner Model) 10 
3.2 Regime 2 ( Provision of Indivisible Public Capital by the 
Government Model ) 14 
3.3 Regime 3 ( Provision of Indivisible Public Capital by the Public 
Monopoly Model) 19 
Chapter 4. Quantitative Comparison 27 
4.1 Calibration 27 
4.2 Numerical Results 29 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4.1 Summary of Calibration Targets 32 
Table 4.2 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.20).…33 
Table 4.3 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.25).... 34 
Table 4.4 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.30).... 35 
Table 4.5 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.35).... 36 
Table 4.6 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.40) •…37 
Table 4.7 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.45).... 38 
Table 4.8 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.50).... 39 
Table 4.9 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.55).... 40 
Table 4.10 Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes (R=0.60). 41 
vii 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
A.l Deriving the Growth Rate of Regime 1 42 
A.2 Deriving the Welfare of Regime 1 45 
A.3 Deriving the Growth Rate of Regime 2 45 
A.4 Deriving the Welfare of Regime 2 51 
A.5 Deriving the Growth Rate of Regime 3 52 
A.6 Deriving the Welfare of Regime 3 56 
A.7 Gauss Programme Used for Simulations 57 
1 Introduction 
Starting from the 1980s, privatization has been rapidly spread at an increasing 
rate world over 一 in Europe, North America and numerous developing countries 
in Africa and Latin America. According to Vickers and Yarrow (1991)，these 
privatization programs can be classified into 3 categories, namely (1) privati-
zation of competitive firms - or more generally, transfer to private sector of 
state-owned enterprises which operate in competitive markets without substan-
tial market failures; (2) contracting out of publicly financed services which are 
previously performed by public sector organizations; and the last category we 
are most concerned in this thesis: (3) privatization of monopolies - transfer 
to the private sector of state-owned enterprises with substantial market power, 
where indivisibility of networks or ever-increasing return to scale such that the 
most efficient market is a single firm. For our easy reference, we define a new 
term - indivisible public capital - for this specific type of natural monopoly 
state-owned enterprises 
One of the reasons why we spend ample effort to investigate this indivisi-
ble public capital is that the stock of this capital is usually very large. Prom 
Munnell (1992)，it is estimated that U.S. economy possessed up to $647.5 billion 
US dollars of indivisible public capital stock in 1991, which was approximately 
one-third of the aggregate public capital stock.丄 With its large magnitude, the 
impact of indivisible public capital on private sector output and productivity is 
1 It is calculated by the sum-up of different types of public capital stock which include water 
and sewer systems, conservation and development structures and electric and gas facilities, 
transit systems, Airfield, etc. 
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substantial. Although there is currently no specific empirical studies to examine 
the role of indivisible public capital as an input in the production process, we 
can still recognize its importance by taking other empirical studies on public 
infrastructure as our reference. Among the first to estimate the impact of pub-
lic infrastructure on output in an aggregate production function framework is 
Ratner (1983) who uses annual data for the US from 1949 to 1973 and finds an 
estimated output elasticity of public capital (没 3 ) of 0.06. Aschauer (1989) pro-
duces a widely cited estimated of of 0.39, using annual data of the US from 
1949 to 1985. Moreover, Aschauer includes a measure of capacity utilization 
in his regression. Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Munnell (1990) obtained estimates of 
similar magnitudes. Ai and Cassou (1995) estimate public capital in a neoclas-
sical growth model and use GMM to estimate Euler equations. Their estimate 
of is 0.2. Finn (1993) uses GMM to estimate a model of productive highway-
capital which is publicly provided, subject to congestion and a complementary 
input to private transportation capital. The productivity coefficient of highway 
capital is estimated to be 0.16. 
After knowing that the importance of indivisible public capital on produc-
tivity, a puzzle which stirs up great policy debate arises: Will privatization 
of indivisible public capital instigate economic growth and improve welfare of 
economy? Many studies have tried to address this problem but still no definite 
conclusion could be drawn as their findings are poles apart. For proponents' 
side, Galal and et al (1994) gives the first comprehensive empirical study of 
privatization to measure the welfare effect on different agents in the economy. 
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Among all the ventures investigated, eleven out of the twelve of them succeeded 
in benefiting most economic actors and their countries. Bradburd (1995) pro-
poses a simple static model that calculates the welfare changes when a natural 
monopoly public enterprise is replaced by a profit maximizing private monopoly. 
He shows that the efficiency gains tends to outweigh any loss of allocative effi-
ciency. For the opponents' side, Vickers and Yarrow (1989) present a theoretical 
model showing that the duplication of fixed costs associated with firm entry out-
weighs the benefits enjoyed by consumers. Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) cite 
extensive market failure in less-developed countries, and thus highly critical of 
privatization efforts in these countries. Willner (1996) argues the validity of 
model by Bradburd (1995); he points out that Bradburd's analysis is based on 
flaw definition of total surplus and after correcting it, privatization would be 
likely to reduce welfare. 
Inspiring from our real world evidence that the impact of privatizing in-
divisible public capital on economic growth and welfare is so ambiguous, this 
thesis attempts to develop a theoretical framework to compare the growth rate 
and welfare under different situations. Based on the simplified version of Cas-
soii and Lansing (1998), three separate endogenous growth models will be built, 
namely, (1) Social Planner Model (benchmark case), (2) Provision of Indivisible 
Public Capital by the Government Model and (3) Provision of Indivisible Public 
Capital by a Publicly-owned Monopoly Model. After deriving the growth rate 
and welfare of each model, we assign parameter values that match empirically 
observed features in our real world for calibration. 
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The organization of this thesis is simple. In chapter 2, a brief literature 
review of impact of privatization on economy will be presented. In chapter 3, we 
develop a theoretical framework by studying the 3 regimes as mentioned in the 
above paragraph. In chapter 4，we describe how to obtain the parameter values 
and compare the welfare and growth rate among different regimes. Chapter 5 
presents our conclusion. 
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2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, we will have a quick review on the literature concerning priva-
tization of natural monopoly public enterprises. 
Galal, Jones, Tandon, Vogelsang (1994) presents the first comprehensive 
empirical study of divestiture to measure its effects on sellers, buyers, con-
sumers, workers and competitors. The study measures changes in producer and 
consumer surplus and answers questions about who won, who lost, and gives 
detailed explanation. The sample includes case studies of twelve enterprises in 
four countries: one industrial (the United Kingdom) and three middle-income 
(Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico). The enterprises analyzed are in the fields of avi-
ation, energy, telecommunications, transportation and etc., Eleven of the twelve 
ventures succeeded in benefiting most economic actors and their countries. This 
overwhelming success followed from the fact that the countries described did 
most things right although details of the right things were not always the same 
for each case. However, because the sample is small and nonrandom, the results 
of the study cannot be used for prediction, especially in very poor countries or 
in the former centrally planned economies. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1989) discusses the trade-off between allocative effi-
ciency and scale economies for privatization of natural monopolies. They show 
that even though the monopolistic behaviour of natural monopoly worsen al-
• locative efficiency, the best strategy is still a single firm market because the 
undesirable duplication of fixed costs with firm entry outweighs the benefits 
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from better allocative efficiency. 
Bradburd (1995) presents a simple model that calculates - as a percent-
age of industry revenues - the welfare gains or losses that might ensue when a 
public enterprise natural monopoly is replaced by a profit maximizing private 
monopoly. The model incorporates both the pre-privatization demand elasticity 
and production efficiency changes subsequent to privatization. The magnitude 
of the welfare changes suggests that allocative efficiency improvements do not 
provide a compelling rationale for post-privatization regulation. He shows that 
the deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing by unregulated privatized natural 
monopolies are likely to be modest and that they may well be outweighed by 
the benefits of improvement in efficiency. Because regulation is not costless, 
and it might well foster static and dynamic efficiency losses which are greater 
than the deadweight monopoly losses it is intended to avoid. And imperfect 
competition too is not socially costless, on balance it is not obvious that less 
developed countries will experience an increase in combined consumer and pro-
ducer surplus in either the short run or the long run if their natural monopoly 
public enterprises are regulated after privatization. 
Willner (1996) responses to Bradburd (1995) who argues that the efficiency 
gains of privatizing a natural monopoly are likely to outweigh any loss of alloca-
tive efficiency. However, a trade-off based on a definition of the total surplus 
which includes profits but not internal rents is flawed. After correcting the 
analysis, he shows that even stronger conditions have to be met before pri-
vatizing a natural monopoly is beneficial. He presents a recent evidence on 
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demand elasticity and efficiency differences which suggests that privatization 
would be likely to reduce welfare even according to Bradburd's approach. He 
cites eighteen studies comparing efficiency in public enterprises and private en-
terprises of electric and water utilities. Eight out of them concludes public 
production is superior while another nine claims no difference or ambiguous 
results. 
With regards to regulation issues, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) points out 
that while considering privatizing natural monopolies, intervention by govern-
ment is likely to be desirable on welfare grounds and regulation should be called 
for. When a firm is both privatized and regulated, welfare changes depending 
upon the nature of the game between the firms and the government. As there 
is asymmetric information between both parties, the welfare effects of priva-
tizing monopolies depend significantly upon how well regulatory problems are 
overcome. 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
The basic framework we employ is the simplified version of Cassou and Lansing 
(1998). Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The closed economy mainly 
consists of representative households and representative firms. In the following 
part we will investigate assumptions imposed on representative households and 
representative firms. 
Firms 
There are a large number of representative firms which are owned by the 
households. Firms produce goods, pay wage for labor input and rental payment 
for capital input. Each firm has access to the production function which can 
be written as 
(1) 
where parameter > 0,没i > 0 for i = 1,2,3, and + = 1- Vt is the per 
capita output. Under this production function setting, there are three factors 
of production: kt is the per capita stock of private capital, k is per capita 
labor supply and gt is per capita stock of indivisible public capital stock in the 
representative firm. The production function exhibits positive and diminishing 
marginal products with respect to each input. Output is also affected by ht, 
which is an index measuring the effort individual spent on learning that can 
augment the productive capacity of labor. This is assumed that the effort spent 
on learning is proportional to private capital held by the representative firms. 
Thus, the effectiveness of labor grows proportionally with the average private 
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capital stock in the economy. This concept can be captured by the specification 
ht = kt, where kt is the average capital stock across firms. The assumption that 
firms consider ht as exogenous requires that there exists a large number of firms 
in which no single firm has an impact on kt- Furthermore, as we assume that all 
firms are identical, the condition kt = kt will hold at equilibrium. We therefore 
impose 
ht = kt = kt (2) 
after all firms choose their optimal labor and capital input levels. 
Another assumption we impose is the 100% depreciation rate of both private 
and indivisible public capital. Although this assumption is highly unrealistic 
and should not be applied when it comes to simulation; for our theoretical 
purpose, this assumption makes our comparison among the 3 regimes simpler 
and more transparent. 
Households 
There are also a large number of representative households. Population, 
which corresponds to the number of workers and consumers, is constant. Every 
period, each member in the household provides labor service in exchange for 
wages, rents whatever capital it owns to firms to receive interest payment. 
The household divides its income (from the labor and capital it supplies and, 
potentially, from the profits it receives from firms) at each period between 
consumption and investment in order to maximize its lifetime utility. 
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The household's utility function takes the form 
oo 
U = j y M c t - B h t q ) , (3) 
t=o 
where p is the discount factor {0 < p < 1); the greater is p, the less the household 
values future consumption relative to current consumption, q is the per capita 
consumption at period t. It is the per capita labor supply, ht measures the 
effort spent on learning. The parameters B > 0 and 7 > 1 affect the supply of 
market labor, where 1/(7 — 1) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
labor supply. As 7 becomes large, this elasticity of substitution approaches 0 
and the model reduces to a fixed supply of labor. The utility function can be 
interpreted as the reduced form of one that incorporates home production.^ 
This completes the basic setup. In the ensuing parts of this chapter, we 
will characterize the 3 regimes outlined in the introduction. Details derivation 
of long-run growth rate and welfare of each regime will be worked out for 
comparison in next chapter. 
3.1 Regime 1 (Social Planner Model ) 
In this model, we consider there exists a benevolent social planner who dictates 
the choices of consumption, investment of both private capital and indivisible 
public capital over time in order to maximize the welfare of the representative 
agent. This is served as a benchmark case for comparison of growth rate and 
-See Greenood et al. (1995). 
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welfare with the those of next two regimes. Under social planner model, the 
maximization problem becomes, 
Maximize 
oo 
Y ^ p ' H c t - B h t l ] ) (4) 
t=0 
subject to 
ct + kt+i + gt+i = Akf' (htk付 (5) 
Lagragian equation can be written as: 
oo 
L (•) = Y/ - BhtQ) + Au [Akl^htkf'gt' — Q — h+i - gt+i] } (6) 
t=o 
The first order conditions of the above problem are: 
^ ： — ^ = (7a) 
dct ct - BhtQ 
dL{-) eiyt+i 
^ • = 仲） 
dL{-) (e2yt\ iBhtQ-^ 
: [r^广 ct — BhtQ ( ) 
o : pMt+1 = Mt (7d) 
dQt+i L 9t+i J 
O r / \ 
: yt - Ct — kt+i - gt+i = 0 (7e) 
OAt 
The intuitions of the above equations are simple. Equation (7a) asserts that rep-
resentative agent will equate the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow 
value of wealth, whereas equation (7b) and equation (7d) implies marginal cost 
of giving up a unit of consumption today and turning it into capital investment 
equates the marginal benefit, which is given by the next period value of rental 
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income. Equation (7c) simply equates the loss in utility from providing an 
additional unit of labor to the gain in utility from earning more income for con-
sumption. Equation (7e) is the budget constraint faced by the representative 
agent. 
In addition, the following transversality conditions must be met 
lim p*Xith+i = 0 (8a) 
t—+00 
\imp'Xugt+i = 0 (8b) 
t—oo 
thereby ruling out explosive equilibria. In the steady states, these transversality 
conditions automatically hold for p > 0. 
Using standard techniques, it can be shown that the social planner decision 
rules can be given by (see Appendix A. l ) 
kt+i = pdiVt (9a) 
9t+i 二 p03yt (9b) 
h = 厂 （9c) 
iB \ktj 
ct 二 （1 —/^ > + /3�)2/t (9d) 
It is straight forward to verify the guess above satisfies all the first order 
conditions and transversality conditions and therefore is the solution. To find 
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the output growth rate, we calculate that 
yt+i = A/cf[i(/i,+i"+i)�fji 
J2_ 
= " 姻 ? 叫 缓 ⑵ ( 1 0 ) 
Thus, the rate of output growth in the benchmark case is 
PI = p A f f ^ ' ' 与 ( ^ ) 3 一2 (03严 一 1 (11) 
Note that kt+i = pOiyt and gt+i = pO^yt. It is clear that an increase in 6i 
raises next period private capital for any given current output, an increase in 
9s raises next period public capital for any given current output. Equation (11) 
says that the growth rate is increasing in p and A. The intuition is that an 
increase in p means that individuals discount future utility to a lesser extent 
and therefore would save more to lead economy grow faster; an increase in A 
suggests that productivity is higher and therefore the growth rate is higher. 
Given that ct — BhtQ is proportional to yt and a constant output growth 




= T ^ ln(l - /9 + pe2 - -)yo + Hqi + 1) (12) 
1 一 P 7 (1 - p ) 
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3.2 Regime 2 (Provision of indivisible public capital by the gov-
ernment) 
In this regime, the economy is made up of a large number of representative firms 
which operates in competitive markets and a benevolent government which 
solves a dynamic version of the Ramsey (1927) optimal tax problem to maxi-
mize individual's welfare. The setup is as follows. At the initial period, each 
representative agent anticipates that the government will levy a flat rate tax 
Tt on output and all the tax revenue will be spent on indivisible public capital 
formation for next period. Taking this government policy as exogenous, indi-
vidual then responses optimally by deciding how much to consume and how 
much to invest on private capital. Eventually, the government sets optimal Tt 
that maximizes each representative individual's welfare after considering their 
rational responses. 
The representative firms problem on profit maximization is similar to pre-
vious model except the formation of indivisible public capital is done by the 
government. The firm's decision can be summarized as 
Maximize 
= Akt' Wt付—4kt — Wtk (13) 
where r�denotes the real rental payment on private capital stock and wt is the 
real wage. The firm earns an economic profit which equals to the difference 
between the value of output and payments made to factor markets. Prom our 
assumption about firm ownership, it suggests that all households receive the 
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same amount of profit and hold it as dividends. The market clearing prices for 
private capital and labor inputs and the resulting profit TTf can be worked out 
from the first-order conditions of the above maximization problem which are 
given as: 
dh . 一 h ( ) 
dn d2yt N 
• 叫 _ 
T^ t = { I - 0 1 - e2)yt (14c) 
Given the interest income, wage and output price, each representative house-
hold responds optimally by deciding how much to consume and how much to 
save on private capital investment. 
Maximize 
oo 
Y , p ' H c t - B h t q ) (15) 
t=0 
subject to 
ct + kt+i = (1 - Tt){4kt + wtk + TTt) (16) 
Lagragian equation can be written as 
oo 




The first order conditions of the above problem are 
^ ： ~ ^ = (18a) 
oct Ct - BhtQ 
: pA 糾 = (18b) 
f : 、 [ 社 長 _ 
^ ^ ： (1 - Tt){r^,kt + wtk + -Kt) - C t - h+i = 0 (18d) 
The intuition of the above equations is similar to the previous regime. Equa-
tion (18a) asserts that representative agent will equate the marginal utility of 
consumption to the shadow value of wealth, whereas equation (18b) implies 
marginal cost of giving up a unit of consumption today and turning it into 
capital investment equates the marginal benefit, which is given by the next pe-
riod after-tax value of rental income. Equation (18c) simply equates the loss 
in utility from providing an additional unit of labor to the gain in utility from 
earning more income for consumption. Equation (18d) is the budget constraint 
faced by the representative agent. 
In addition, the following transversality conditions must be met: 
= 0 (19a) 
t—>oo 
thereby ruling out explosive equilibria. In the steady states, these transversality 
conditions automatically hold for p > 0. 
Using standard techniques, it can be shown that the household's optimal 
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decision rules are given by (see Appendix A.3) 
h+i = pd i { l -Tt )y t (20a) 
It = ( 1 - 〜 ⑷ （施） 
Q = ( l - p 0 i ) ( l - r t ) y t (20c) 
By our assumption that all tax proceed will be spent on indivisible public 
capital, the specification of government's budget constraint is therefore given 
as: 
fft+i = TtVt (21) 
% 
Given the above individual's response, the government chooses {r^, gt+i, 
kt+i，Ct, k } to maximize the discounted utility of the representative house-
hold. The government maximization becomes: 
Maximize 
oo 
Y ^ p U n { c t - B h t l ] ) (22) 
t=o 
subject to 
Ct 二 (l-p0iXl-Tt)yt (23a) 
kt+i = p0i(l - Tt)yt (23b) 
h = ( 1 - T t ) 黑 f (23c) 
9t+i = Ttyt (23d) 
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Standard techniques yield the following optimal decision rule (see appendix 
A.3): 
9t+\ = pGsyt (24a) 
Tt = pOs (24b) 
Notice the level of investment on indivisible capital is equal to that in regime 
1，the intervention of government only distorts the individual's behavior on 
private capital investment. 
It is straight forward to verify the guess above satisfies all the first order 
conditions and transversality conditions and therefore is the solution. To find 




Thus, the rate of per capita output growth when the provision of public capital 
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is done by the government is 
92 二 —叫严 
. t ( l l � 3 ) w U ( l - P " 3 ) J / 
• 0 � - 1 (26) 
Similar to the previous regime, the welfare can be worked out as (see ap-
pendix A.4): 
oo 
购 = ^ p ' l n ( c t - B h t l t ) 
t=o 
= l n ( l - - - ) ( ! - pes) yo + — H 9 2 + 1) (27) 
1 - P 7 (1 - p) 
3.3 Reg ime 3 (Provision of indivisible public capital by publicly 
owned m o n o p o l y f irm) 
In this regime, a publicly owned monopoly firm takes over indivisible public 
capital and we assume that monopoly firm has perfect information on represen-
tative agent's demand for its product. Monopoly firm will maximize its life-time 
profit by setting the price of public capital good and decide how much to in-
vest on indivisible public capital for next period. All profit will be returned 
to each representative agent at the end of each period as dividends. Taking 
the price of public capital and dividends from monopoly firm as exogenous, the 
representative agent will then respond optimally by reallocating its income be-
tween consumption, investment on private capital and rental payment of public 
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capital to the monopoly. 
The representative firm's problem on profit maximization is similar to the 
previous model except the indivisible public capital is provided by the monopoly 
firm at price pt. Following the notation of regime 2, the representative firm's 
decision can be summarized as: 
Maximize 
TT, = Akt' {htkf'gp - — Pt9t - Wtk (28) 
And the first-order conditions of the above maximization problem are 
dnt Osyt / o n � 
I (29c) 
TTt = { 1 - 6 1 - 6 2 - e^)yt (29d) 
Given the interest income from private capital, price of public capital set 
by the monopoly, wage and output price, each representative household re-
sponds optimally by deciding how much to consume on consumption good and 




Y ^ p ' H c t - B h t q ) (30) 
f = 0 
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subject to 
Ct + kt+i = r^kt + wtk +Trt + Ilt (31) 
where is the profit from the monopoly distributed to each individual house-
hold. 
Lagragian equation can be written as: 
oo 
L (•) = Y / - BhtlD + A3f Ir'^ kt + wtk + tt, + 1 1广 Q - fc^+i] } (32) 
t=o 
The first order conditions of the above problem are: 
^ : ^ = (33a) 
dct Ct - BhtQ 、 乂 
^ ： = A3f (33b) 
dL{-) . ^Bhtir' _ 
^ • 知 = (33c) 
：々kt + Wtk +TTt + Ut-ct- kt+i = 0 ( 3 3 d ) 
OAt 
The intuition is similar to the previous regimes. Equation (33a) asserts that 
representative agent will equate the marginal utility of consumption to the 
shadow value of wealth, whereas equation (33b) implies marginal cost of giving 
up a unit of consumption today and turning it into capital investment equates 
the marginal benefit, which is given by the value of rental income next period. 
Equation (33c) simply equates the loss in utility from providing an additional 
unit of labor to the gain in utility from earning more income for consumption. 
Equation (33d) is simply the budget constraint faced by the representative 
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agent. 
A publicly owned monopoly firm takes over indivisible public capital and 
has perfect information on representative firm's demand for this capital. By 
controlling how much to invest on public capital and how much to charge rep-
resentative firm on public capital, the monopoly aims at maximizing its lifetime 
profit. At the end of each period, the profit will be distributed to household as 
dividends. Monopoly firm's decision can be summarized as 
Maximize 
oo 
P^^t where 11^  = ptgt - Qt+i (34) 
t=o 
subject to 
Pt = — — (35) 
9t 
Lagragian equation can be written as: 
oo 
Lm{-) = j y ( " t " ) � ? 3 —夕计 1) (36) 
t=0 
The first order conditions of the above problem are: 
^ ^ ： = 1 (37) 
In addition, the following transversality conditions must be met : 
limp'Aat^t+i == 0 (38a) 
•OO 
\imp'X3tgt+i = 0 (38b) 
t—*oo 
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thereby ruling out explosive equilibria. In the steady states, these transversality 
conditions automatically hold for p > 0. 
Standard techniques yield the following optimal policy rules (see Appendix 
A.5): 
fct+i = asyt (39a) 
9t+i = bsyt ( 3 9 b ) 
ct = (1 - as - b3)yt (39d) 
where 
as = pdi 
h = p9i p9iA — 
J 
C3 = (1 - as - 63) 
From the equations (34) and (35), we can easily find that the maximum 
profit monopoly firm can earn at each period is given by 
^tMAX = {O3 — h h t (40) 
It is straight forward to verify the guess above satisfies all the first order 
conditions and transversality conditions and therefore is the solution. To find 
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the output growth rate, we calculate that 
yt+i = 计 二 1 
Bo 
• < ^ [ W j > 
V / 
( 韵 m (41) 
V / 
Thus, the per capita output growth rate in this regime is 
= A (p没 1,1+没2 
92 
… 等 象 “ 部 ( 等 y - > 
V 
� \ 没3 
. 购 … ! 4 与 ) - 1 (42) 
J 
V / 





( r D 1 _ _ 
= — I n p9lA - ' M y o 
1 — p \-rB J 7 
� / 
+ - — ^ H 9 3 + 1) (43) 
(1 - P ) 
The model in this regime can be elaborated by assuming that a profit cap is 
imposed on the monopoly firm. Suppose the monopoly firm is regulated and the 
profit it can earn at each period is bounded by 11^ , where Ut is assumed to be 
proportional to the output each period, that is: < 4>他 where 小七 < (没3 _ 知）• 
The monopoly firm will then have the following maximization problem. 
Maximize 
oo 
^ pt^lt where = ptgt — gt+i (44) 
t=o 
subject to 
Pt = — (45a) 
9t 
n^ < (PtVt (45b) 
The above maximization problem results in a corner solution and the monopoly 
firm invests at 
9t+i = {<Pt 一 ^3)yt (46) 
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Notice that the the profit constraint can lead to Pareto optimum by setting 
+ (47) 
as the investment of public capital will be given by gt^i = 微,which gives 
the per capita growth rate and welfare at the same level in social planner model. 
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4 Quantitative Comparison 
4.1 Calibration 
This chapter is devoted to the calibration of previous model settings, aiming 
at comparing level of welfare among different regimes. To meet with our real 
world experience, parameter values are assigned based on the platform in which 
public capital is provided by the government rather than on the basis of the 
theoretical social planner model or the newly established Provision of Indivisible 
Public Capital by Publicly-owned Monopoly model. 
Following Cassou and Lansing (1998)，we select parameter values which 
match the empirically observed features of the U.S. economy on the balanced 
growth path. From Greenwood, Hercowitz and HufFord (1988)，they estimate a 
range of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply 1/(7 — 1) and 
by choosing its median value which is equal to 1.7，we can assign 7 = 1.6. For 
labor share of output 认 2 ， t h e empirical estimates vary according to how the 
different types of income (e.g. indirect business taxes, imputed services from 
consumer durables and proprietor's income) are apportioned between labor and 
capital. We set 62 = 0.58 for it is used by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) 
and is close to empirical studies by Christiano (1988) in which estimate of Q2 is 
equal to 0.6. Besides, each representative agent is assumed to have 500 units of 
private capital and indivisible public capital as endowment at the initial period. 
Since the specific empirical study on output elasticity of indivisible public 
capital is currently unavailable in literatures, it makes choosing the value of 
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03 a tough question. To remain objective in our analysis, we adopt a wide 
range of based on the observed public to private capital ratio. Prom Cassou 
and Lansing (1999), the observed public to private capital ratio (_R) in the U.S. 
ranges between 0.4 and 0.6. To take into consideration that only approximately 
40% of the public capital is indivisible, we further assume our optimal public 
to private ratio falls into 0.2 to 0.6.3 Therefore, by putting this value into the 
equations(23b) and (24b), has the value between 0.0663 and 0.1433 and Oi 
can be retrieved by using the equation + + = 1-
Given values for 61, 62, and 7 , we select the remaining parameters 
p, A and B such that the balanced growth path in regime 2 displays the 
following 3 properties. First, we choose an after-tax interest rate r of 6.9% 
based on the value estimated by Cooley and Prescott (1995). It is defined by 
introducing privately issued real bonds in the household budget constraint and 
the first order condition for bonds gives 1 + f = (1 + 92)/P- Second, time en-
dowment is normalized to one thousand in the model, we set I = 333 implying 
that each household spends one-third of their time in work. The third property 
is that the per capita growth rate on the balanced growth path equals to 
2.1% by using the average of U.S. data from 1955 to 1970. The reason for not 
selecting up-to-date data is that U.S economy exhibits an significant slowdown 
in per capita growth rate as the consequence its undesirable fiscal policy in 
that period.4 The table 4.1 summarizes the calibration targets for the above 
3see table 1 in Munnell (1992) 




4.2 Simulation Results 
Given all the parameter values, the numerical results of the welfare among 3 
regimes are computed using the Guass programme which is attached in appen-
dix A.7. Tables 4.2-10 summarize the simulation results which include the pa-
rameter values, labor supply, indivisible public and private capital investment, 
denoted as gt+\/yt and fct+iA/t, the per capita growth rate and the welfare 
among all regimes. For different sets of ratio of public to private capital cho-
sen, social planner model yields the highest growth rate and welfare as we can 
expect before performing simulation. Our focus shifts to the issue whether the 
indivisible public capital be provided by the government or by the monopoly 
firm. Prom the simulation results we can observed that under the range of 
all parameters considered, it is clear that government provision yields a better 
growth rate and welfare. The reason is that the distortion on indivisible public 
capital investment is far more severe under the control by the monopoly firm. 
In order to maximize it's lifetime profit, the monopoly firm raises the price of 
public capital extravagantly by limiting its supply. It can be revealed by the 
fact that public capital investment drops significantly from regime 2 to regime 
3. Moreover, as seen from equation (20b), the larger drop in public capital 
investment will induce greater decline in labor supply which further jeopardize 
economic growth and welfare. The results suggest that government should not 
privatize its natural monopoly state-owned enterprises unless regulatory system 
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is set up to promote indivisible public capital investment. Prom the previous 
chapter, we have shown that under proper regulatory policy such as profit cap, 
the resulting welfare of privatizing indivisible public capital can be improved 
greatly. The profit cap factor, 0, which measure the profit ceiling (as a fraction � 
of output) for the monopoly, has been presented in each table. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempted to give an answer to a controversial issue: Should 
indivisible public capital be provided by the government or by a publicly owned 
monopoly? By constructing endogenous growth models for each situation, we 
showed that if government provides the public capital, the resulting growth rate 
and welfare will be higher than under provision by monopoly. However, when 
regulation like profit cap is imposed on the monopoly, the resulting growth and 
welfare can be greatly improved to the level under social planner. Although 
the model we used to derive this result was highly simplified, the basic message 
conveyed is crystal clear. The normative lesson is that governments should 
always set regulations for privatized monopoly when they consider selling out 
their natural monopoly enterprises. 
Last but not the least, the models present in this paper have some short-
comings and can be improved in several ways. Some of the assumptions about 
functional forms could be relaxed. Once we assume incomplete depreciation of 
both capitals, simulation analysis would then permit us to characterize not just 
the long-run growth rate, but also the transitional dynamics as well. Also, the 
models do not consider the operational efficiency between private enterprises 
and public enterprises. Finally, to make a more comprehensive quantitative 
comparison, a wider range of parameter values can be selected by using data of 
other countries for calibration. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Calibration Targets 
Calibration information 
Calibration Target 
Fraction of time working 0.333 
After tax interest rate (per cent) 6.900 
Per capita growth rate (per cent) 2.100 
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes 
Parameter values 
e 1 0.3537 
62 0.5800 






Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.3578 0.3165 0.3378 
gt+i/yt 0.0633 0.0633 0.0035 
Ct/yt 0.5789 0.6202 0.6587 
It 353.5402 333.0000 292.8507 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.1236 1.0210 0.8313 
welfare 192.1333 149.7664 54.4088 
profit cap factor {(/)) 0.129623 
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Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Iq+i/yt 0.3258 0.3013 0.3258 
gt+i/yt 0.0753 0.0753 0.0048 
c/yt 0.5989 0.6234 0.6694 
It 357.4017 333.0000 289.0412 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.1433 1.0210 0.8140 
welfare 201.7191 151.5434 46.6253 
profit cap factor {(f>) 0.154257 
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Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.3148 0.2877 0.3448 
gt+i/yt 0.0863 0.0863 0.0062 
c/yt 0.5989 0.6260 0.6490 
It 360.9110 333.0000 285.9853 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.1613 1.0210 0.8003 
welfare (W) 210.2872 153.0593 40.4155 
profit cap factor�(f) 0.176741 
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Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.3048 0.2754 0.3048 
gt+i/yt 0.0964 0.0964 0.0077 
c/Yt 0.5988 0.6282 0.6875 
It 364.1183 333.0000 283.4795 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.1779 1.0210 0.7891 
welfare 218.0063 154.3701 35.3590 
profit cap factor {(f>) 0.19727 
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Table 4.10: Comparison of Growth Rate and Welfare among 3 regimes 
(R=Q.40) 
Parameter values 
e 1 0.3093 
02 0.5800 





B . 0.0001 
Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.2955 0.2642 0.2955 
gt+i/yt 0.1057 0.1057 0.0091 
Ct/yt 0.5988 0.6301 0.6954 
It 367.0641 333.0000 281.3903 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.1932 1.0210 0.7798 
welfare 225.0070 155.5162 31.1779 
profit cap factor {(f) 0.21643 
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Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.2868 0.2540 0.2868 
gt+i/yt 0.1143 0.1143 0.0106 
ct/yt 0.5989 0.6317 0.7026 
It 369.7816 333.0000 279.6252 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.2073 1.0210 0.7720 
welfare 231.3929 156.5274 27.6790 
profit cap factor [(f)) 0.223468 
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B . 0.0001 
Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.2788 0.2447 0.2788 
gt+i/yt 0.1223 0.1223 0.0120 
c/Yt 0.5989 0.6330 0.7092 
It 372.2983 333.0000 278.1179 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.2205 1.0210 0.7654 
welfare 237.2472 157.4267 24.7234 
profit cap factor {(f>) 0.250448 
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Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.2713 0.2361 0.2713 
gt+i/yt 0.1298 0.1298 0.0134 
c/Yt 0.5989 0.6341 0.7153 
It 374.6373 333.0000 276.8193 
growth factor (1 + g) 1.2328 1.0210 0.7597 
welfare 242.6383 158.2319 22.2076 
profit cap factor {(/>) 0.265698 
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Balanced growth properties among different regimes 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
kt+i/yt 0.2643 0.2281 0.2643 
gt+i/yt 0.2281 0.1369 0.0148 
c/yt 0.5076 0.6350 0.7209 
It 376.8180 333.0000 275.6922 
growth factor (1 +g) 1.2443 1.0210 0.7547 
welfare 247.6226 158.9571 20.0629 
profit cap factor {(j)) 0.280166 
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A Appendix 
In this appendix, we provide the detail derivations of the 3 regimes analyzed in 
this thesis. Equations (1) to (47) correspond to those appearing in Chapter 3. 
A . l DERIVING THE G R O W T H RATE OF REGIME 1 
The optimization problem of the social planner model is straight forward. The 
social planner maximizes the life-time utility of representative agent by choosing 
{gt+i, h+i, ct, /(, } 二 0 . The optimization problem becomes 
Maximize 
f ^ p ' l n i c t - B h t Q ) (4) 
t=o 
subject to 
ct + kt+i + gt+i = Ak',^{htltf'gt' (5) 
Lagragian equation can be written as: 
oo "n 
L (.) = Y/ — BhtQ) + {htkf'gt' _ ct - kt+i — pt+ij | (6) 
t=o 
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The first order conditions of the above problem are: 
dL{-) 1 X �� 
• (7a) 
： 成 ⑷ ， = A l t ( 7b ) 
okt+i kt+i 
dL{-) . A (e2yt\ iBhir' 
^ ： p A . , . (7d) 
dLi-) , ,� …� 
ox : yt-ct- kt+i - gt+i = 0 (7e) 
OAt 
In addition, the following transversality conditions must be met : 
lim p^Xitkt+i = 0 (8a) 
t—KX> 
limp* 入 itpt+i = 0 (8b) t—*oo 
Now we would like to work out the solution of the above maximization 
problem. Prom equation (7c) we have 
iBhtQ = e2yt (48) 
Using equations (1) and (2) to solve equation (48) for k yields 
(49) 
iB \ktj 
To find the other decision rules we use the method of undetermined coefficients. 
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We guess that the solution to the above equations has the following forms: 
h+i = aiyt (50) 
9t+i = hyt (51) 
^ = ciVt (52) 
Mt 
where ai,bi and ci are constant to be determined. Substituting these into 
equations (7b) and (7d) and solving ai and bi gives 
ai — p9\ (53) 
h = pOz (54) 
We also need to verify that our guess is correct by verifying that ci is, in fact, 
a constant. To do this, we use equations (7a) and (52) to obtain 
Ct = ciut + BhtQ (55) 
Substituting this expression into equations (7e) and using equations (48), (50) 
and (51), we can solve for ci 
02 
ci = 1 — ai _ 6i (56) 
7 
Substituting the expression for ci into equation (55) and combining it with 
equation (48) 
Q = (1 - a i - bi)yt (57) 
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It is straight forward to verify the guess above satisfies all the first order con-
ditions and transversality conditions and therefore is the solution. 
A.2 DERIVING THE WELFARE OF REGIME 1 
The detailed derivation of Wi is shown below 
oo 
t^i = Z / 9 ” n ( c t - 脚 ? ） 
t=0 
= l n ( c o - Bhol^) + p\n{ci - BhilJ) + ... 
= l n ( l - p + pe2- —)yo + pln(l - f ) + p02 — -){91 + l)yo + …(12) 
7 7 
= l n ( l - /9 + p92 - —)yo + Hgi + 1) 
1 - P 7 ( 1 - p ) 
A.3 DERIVING THE GROWTH RATE OF REGIME 2 
In this part, we deal with the household maximization problem and government 
maximization problem respectively 
The representative firm's decision can be summarized as 
Maximize 
TTt = Akf' Qitk 付 - r t h — Wtk (12) 
The first-order conditions of the above maximization problem are 
瓷 ： t 字 _ 
TTt = (1 - - e2)yt (14c) 
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Given the interest income, wage and output price, each representative household 




J 2 p ' H c t - B h t Q ) (15) 
<=0 
subject to 
Ct + kt+i 二（1 - rt){r'^kt + wtk + n ) (16) 
Lagragian equation can be written as: 
oo 
L (.) = {ln(ct - BUI) + f(l - rt){r^^kt + wth + n) — Q — /^i+i] } 
(17) 
The first order conditions of the above problem are: 
^ ： A . (18a) 
oct Ct — Bhtll 
: pA2t+i ( l - r ,+ i )r?+i = A2e (18b) 
# : ( 一 長 _ 
^ ^ ： (1 - TtXrt% + Wtlt + TTt) -Ct- kt+1 = 0 (18d) 
To find out the solution, we first substitute equation (18a) into (18c) and 
using wt = yields 
iBhtl^ = (1- Tt)02yt (60) 
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Using equations (1) and (2) to solve equation (60) for k yields 
, r e^A / p A ' ' ] ^ ,r i� 
h = ( 1 - T t ) - ^ Y (61) 
To find the other decision rules we use the method of undetermined coefficients. 
We guess that the solution to the above equations has the following forms: 
kt+i = a 2 { l - r t ) y t (62a) 
= b2 { l - r t )y t (62b) 
入2t 
where 02»&2 are constant to be determined. Substituting these into equation 
(18b) and solving 02 gives 
(22 = p9i (63) 
We also need to verify that our guess is correct by verifying that 62 is, in fact, 
a constant. To do this, we use equations (18a) and (60) to obtain 
ct = b2{l -Tt)yt + Bhtq (64) 
Substituting this expression into equations (18d) and using equations (60) and 
(63), we can solve for 62 
62 = 1 ~ <^2 (65) 
7 
Substituting the expression for 62 into equation (64) and combining with equa-
tion (60) gives 
Q 二（1— a2)(l — (66) 
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The government's budget constraint is given as 
9t+i = nyt (21) 
Our assumption of a period-by-period balanced budget facilitates a closed form 
solution to the government's decision problem. The government chooses { t , ’ gt+i, 
kt+i,ct, It to maximize 
f y i 咖 一 脚 ? ） （ 2 2 ) 
<=0 
subject to 
Q = { l - p e i ) { l - r t ) y t (23a) 
kt+i = p e i { l - r t ) y t (23b) 
( • 广 ( - ) 
gt+1 = nyt (23d) 
It will be useful to reduce the number of constraints by eliminating some of the 
variables. We begins by writing equation (23b) in two forms: 
kt+i = pOi{l-Tt)yt 
Tt = (68) 
pOiyt 
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Substitute equation (68) into (23c) to eliminate Tt, yielding 
l , = \ ( h ± L ) f ^ f l ^ (69) 
[\pGiytJ KiB J \ktj J 
Next, substitute this expression for k into equation (1) to obtain 
£2. 
yt = v^^r^f+ii^/ (70) 
where 
-二 KJkf (71a) 
XJ = 01 + 02-— (71b) 
7 
The next step employs equations (21), (68) and (70) to obtain the following 
version of the government budget constraint: 
= 0 (72) 
An expression for the argument of the household utility function can be obtained 
using equations (66)，（21)，(68) and (70). The result is 
1 一 — 令 
ct — BhtlJ = ~ 购 7 fct+i (73) 
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We can now rewrite the Lagrangian for the government problem as 
oo /1 _ pQ §2. \ / £2. k \ 
、 ( . ） = [ — 、 t 、 幽 - j ^ - 9 t + i j (74) 
The first order condition are 
dLg{-) 1 \ 1 7 0 2 � / yt \ 1 1 . yt+i � 
= \ t — “ P^gt+i^-j = 0 (75a) 
okt+\ kt+i ^ LV 7 / \h+ij P没 1 」 h+i 
聲 = 神 必 免 I 絮 — 彻 1 = 0 ( 75c ) 
In addition, the following transversality conditions must be met : 
\imp'\2tkt+i = 0 (19a) 
t—^oo 
lim p^X2gtgt+i = 0 (76a) 
t—+00 
To find the decision rules, we again use the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients. We guess the functional forms 
9t+i = C2yt (77) 
^ = d2yt (78) 
入gt 
where C2 and 6,2 are constants to be determined. Substituting these expression 
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in equation (75b) and solving for C2 gives 
C2 = p93 (79) 
We verify that congesture are correct by showing that 而 is in fact a constant. 
To do this, we substitute the optimal tax rate into equation (23b) to obtain 
k t + i = p 9 i { l - C 2 ) y t (80) 
Substituting this expression, together with equations (77) and (78)，into (75a) 
and solving for 而 yields 
d2 = ^ + p v - { l - p 9 i ) (81) 
7 
Since this is a constant, our guess is confirmed. 
It is straight forward to verify the guess above satisfies all the first order 
conditions and transversality conditions and therefore is the solution. 
A . 4 D E R I V I N G T H E W E L F A R E OF R E G I M E 2 
The detailed derivation of W2 is shown below 
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oo 
W2 = - 5/if/O (27) 
t=o 
= l n ( c o — B / i o Z j ^ ) + / 5 l n ( c i — B/iiZ}^) + … 
= l n ( l - p O i - — ) ( l - p 0 3 ) y o 
7 
+/9ln(l - p0i - — ) ( 1 - p03) {92 + l)yo + … 
7 
= l n ( l - - - ) (1 - pes) yo + 7 — ^ ln("2 + 1) 
1 - P 7 (1 - / o ) 
A.5 DERIVING THE G R O W T H RATE OF REGIME 3 
The representative firms problem on profit maximization is similar to previous 
model except the formation of public capital is done by the monopoly firm. The 
representative firm's decision can be summarized as 
Maximize 
TTt = Akf' {htkf^gl^ - rjh - Pt9t _ mk (28) 
where pt is the price of public capital charged by the monopoly. 
And the first-order conditions of the above maximization problem are 
瓷 ： 々 = 警 (-) 
• 瓷 … _ 
dnt dsyt , … � 
： Pt =—— (29c) 
dgt 9t 
TTf = { 1 - 0 1 - 9 2 - d3)yt ( 2 9 d ) 
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Given the interest income from private capital, price of public capital set by 
the monopoly, wage and output price, each representative household responds 




Y , p ' H c t - B h t Q ) (30) 
<=0 
subject to 
Ct + kt+i = T^h + wtk + vTf + n^ (31) 
where Ilf is the profit from the monopoly distributed to households. 
Lagragian equation can be written as: 
oo r "M 
L (•) = Y/ { ln(Q - BhtQ) + Asf [rt^kt + wtk + tt^  + Hf - q - kt+i\ | (32) 
<=0 
The first order conditions of the above problem are: 
^ ： = As. (33a) 
dct Ct - Bhtlt 
^ ： pXst+irlr = Xm (33b) 
CfKt+l 
dL{-) . jBhtir' 心 、 
: m h t = ^7-77 (33c) 
olt Ct - Bhtlt 
^ ^ : r^kt + Wtk + 'JTt + Ut-ct- kt+i = 0 (33d) 
UAt 
A publicly owned monopoly firms take over public capital and have perfect 
information on representative firm's demand on public capital. Monopoly firm's 




^ ptllt where Ut = ptQt — 9t+i (34) 
t=o 
subject to 
Pt =—— (35) 
9t 
Lagragian equation can be written as: 
oo 
Lm{-) = ( 〜 他 广 — 9t+i) (36) 
t=0 
the first order conditions of the above problem are: 
^ ^ ： pelAktU{ht+ilt+ipg?ri' = 1 (37) 
In addition, the following transversality conditions must be met : 
\imp^X3tkt+i = 0 (38a) 
t—*oo 
\imp*X3t9t+i = 0 (38b) 
t—oo 
To find the solution of this maximization problem, we substitute equation 
(33a) into (33c) and using Wt = 勢 yields 
iBhtQ = 92yt (83) 
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Using equations (1) and (2) to solve equation (83) for k yields 
陶 ( f f 产 (84) 
To find the other decision rules we use the method of undetermined coefficients. 
We guess that the solution to the above equations has the following form: 
h+i = asyt (85a) 
9t+i = hyt ( 8 5 b ) 
= csyt (85c) 
where a^ and 63 are constant to be determined. Substitute these into equations 
(33b) and (85a) and solving 03 gives 
as = pOi (86) 
Using the above equation together with equation (37) and (84) to solve for 63, 
it gives 
7 — 02 
63—1 P的 4 箸广2 (87) 
We also need to verify that our guess is correct by verifying that C3 is, in fact, 
a constant. To do this, we use equations (33a) and (85c) to obtain 
ct = csyt + BhtQ (88) 
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Substituting this expression into equations (33d) and using equation (34)，we 
can solve for C3 
02 
C3 = 1 - 03 - 63 (89) 
7 
Substituting the expression for C3 into equation (88) and combining with equa-
tion (83) 
Q = (1 - as - b3)yt (90) 
It is straight forward to verify the guess above satisfies all the first order 
conditions and transversality conditions and therefore is the solution. 
A . 6 D E R I V I N G T H E W E L F A R E OF R E G I M E 3 
The detailed derivation of W3 is shown below 
00 
W3 - J2pHn{ct-Bhtlt) 
t=o 
= l n ( c o — Bhol'i) + pln(ci - Bhi l l ) + ... 
f 7 - ^ 2 
= I n M - p^i - p9i pelA ( 含 ) - — > 2 / 0 
+p\n <1 - /901 - p9i pOlA ( ) ‘ - — >{93 + l)yo + -
V / 7 、 乂 
( � „ _ i z ^ _ 
1 八 A ra . 02 
= - ~ l u l l - p O i - p6i pOjA — 九 
1 - P / 7 
+ 7 7 - ^ l n ( p 3 + l ) (43) 
(1 - P ) 
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A.7 Gauss Programme Used for Simulations 
® This programme is to calculate the growth factor and the welfare of my 
Mphilpaper ® 
Output file = D：\output7.txt reset； 
gamma1=1.6； 
growthACT=0.021； @ actual per capita growth rate @ 
k=500； ® private capital endowment 0 
g=500; ® public capital endowment @ 
12=33 3/ ®1 abor endowment @ 
Rop=0.3/ ® optimal public to private capital ratio @ 
r=0.069/ ® after tax real interest rate @ 
rho=(1+growthACT)/(1+r)； 
theta2=0.58/ 
X=rho^2/ . , 
Y=rho^2*theta2-rho^2+rho+rho*(1/Rop)； 
Z=rho*(1/Rop)*theta2-rho*(l/Rop)； 
Rootl= (-Y + (Y^2-4*X*Z)^(1/2))/ (2*X) / 
Root2= (-Y - (Y"2-4*X*Z)"(1/2))/(2*X); 
if rootl > 0; 
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？ n n i ; i a l = ( ( ( theta2*A) / ( g a _ a l * B ) ) * (g /k) ^ ( 1 - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 )广（1 / ( g a _ a l _ 
y l t = A * ( k ^ ( t h e t a l + t h e t a 2 ) ) * ( l l i n i t i a r t h e t a 2 ) * ( g ( l - t h e t a l thetaz； ) , 
wi= (1/ (1-rho) ) *ln (1-al-bl- (t:heta2/ga顏al) ) + (1/ (1-rho) ) In (yic) +、rno/ 
r h o ) " 2 ) * 
In(growthl)； ' 
@ regime 2 goverment take over on public capital ® 
a2=rho*thetal; 
t a u = r h o * ( l - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 )； 
k2=a2*(1-tau); 
？ 2 l n ? t i a l = ( ( 1 - t a u ) * ( ( t h e t a 2 * A ) / ( g a m m a l ^ B ) ) * ( g / k ) ^ ( 1 - t h e t a l -
t h e t a 2 ) ) “ ( 1 / ( g a m m a 1 -
5 2 = ( U - U u ) * ( ( theta2*A) / (gammal*B) ) * (g2/k2 广（ l - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 ) ) ^ (1 / (gammal-
(thetal . t h e t a 2 ) ) * ( 1 2 i n i t i a l � h e t a 2 ) * (g^ ( l - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 ) ) ; 
I I I ( 1 / ( i - r h o ) ) * l n ( ( l - a 2 - ( t h e t a 2 / g a m m a l ) ) * ( 1 - t a u ) ) + ( 1 / ( 1 - r h o ) ) * l n ( y 2 t ) + 
(rho/(1-rho)^2)*ln(growth2); 
® regime 3 m o n o p o l y firm take over public capital ® 
b 3 - r h r * t h e t f l * ( rho*theta3* ( 1 - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 ) ( (theta2*A) / (gammal*B) ) ^  
f t h e ^ a 2 / ( g a m L l - t h e t a 2 ) )广（ ( g a m m a l - t h e t a 2 ) / (ga 讓 a l * ( t h e t a l . t h e t a 2 ) -
t h e t a 2 ) ) ; 
k3=a3; 
？ 3 l n i t i a l = ( ( ( t h e t a 2 * A ) / ( g a m m a l * B ) ) * ( g / k ) ^ ( l - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 ) ) ^ ( 1 / ( g a m m a l -
j 3 = n U h e t a 2 * A ) / ( g a _ a l * B ) ) * ( g 3 / k 3广 ( l - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 ) ) ^ ( ^ (gammal-theta2))； 
y 3 t = A M ^ ( t h e t a l ) ? h e t a 2 ) ) * ( I S i n i t i a r t h e t a 2 ) * (g^ ( 1 - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 ) ) ; 
g r o w t h f = A * ( k r ( t L t a l . t h e t a 2 ) ) * ( 1 3 � h e t a 2 ) * (g3； ( l - t h e t a l - t h e t a 2 ) ) ; 






























r e s u l t [ 2 , 4 ] = y 2 t ; 
result[2,5]=growth2/ 
r e s u l t [2,6]=w2； 
r e s u l t [ 3 , 1 ] = k 3 ; 
result[3,2]=g3; 
result [3,3]=13; 
r e s u l t [ 3 , 4 ] = y 3 t ; 
result[3,5]=growth3/ 
result [3,6]=w3; 
format /Ml /LDN 9,4;" g k growthACT Rop r"； 
settingO; 
I I M . 
! 
format /Ml /LDN 9,4;" rho gamma tau A B"; 
settingl； It II . / 
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